Mats Berdal, The UN Security Council: Ineffective but Indispensable, Survival, Vol. 45, No. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 7-30
January 27, 2010
In his article Prof. Mats Berdal discusses the question of the UNSC’s utility and the controversy connected with its actions that caused lots of criticism in the last two decades. The author looks at the several functions of the SC, i.e. a forum for member states to express their standpoint on international issues, a place to promote or protect their national interests by winning others’ support, or a tool to legitimize military actions. Berdal points out that the UNSC is ineffective on the one hand and indispensable on the other hand looking at it through the prism of 9/11 attacks and the US-led war on Iraq. This paradox is based on the fact that, in spite of the SC’s frequent indecisiveness and inability to coordinate its member states, it is still seen as an important actor in the field of international peace and security.
The author goes on to describe how the SC is useful to the P5. Although one of the main principles of the UN is state sovereignty (and non-intervention into domestic affairs of states), the P5 often address the SC to legitimize the use of military force. The question is why the states are so diligent in working through the UN to authorize their actions. The author dwells upon the P5 to find out what motivates them to keep the SC a central structure for maintaining international peace and security.
The UK and France hold on to their membership in order to be listened to. Not being the world’s largest superpowers they contribute enormously to the UN activities in the security field and provide high quality representatives at the headquarters. Thus, to be taken seriously, they work “seriously”. While the UK’s activity is explained by the desire to keep the SC composition and the P5 as it is, France performs its duties and prerogatives because it sees itself as a Great Power. Russia and China use their P5 membership to express their disagreement, especially when it concerns the principle of non-intervention into states’ internal affairs: they refuse to support those UN actions under Chapter VII that can create a precedent for their own controversial internal relations (e.g. China-Taiwan, Russia-Chechnya).
The role of the US and the utility of the SC to this superpower have a more complicated character. As the author points out, a superficial analysis of the US behaviour and UN effectiveness gives an idea that the US does not need the SC to prove its status and, as in the case of Iraq invasion, its approval. Nonetheless, the US repeatedly draws the UN attention to the issues where it sees its national interests being at stake. According to Berdal, the reason not being the legitimacy the SC confers on the US actions, but the costliness of not doing so. Through the prism of neo-conservatism, the author provides his interpretation on the effect of 9/11 on already existing divisions among the SC members. In the post-9/11 world the different views on the UN among the neo-conservatives came to light, but the general sentiment suggested preventive and pre-emptive action over deterrence. Although the so-called “Bush Doctrine” disagrees with the UN principles, the US administration made the effort to internationalize the problem in order to win support for the likely war.
While assessing the consequences of the war for the UNSC, Berdal once again draws a distinction between the permanent members (this time the P4), wider UN membership, and the US. In the short-term perspective the Iraq crisis and tensions in the SC had its toll on France-US relations, however, the US relations with Russia and China did not change. In the long-term perspective we can still feel the consequences of this crisis for the UNSC, the reason being the complete exclusion of non-permanent/elected members from consultations over Resolution 1441 drafts. This fact supports Berdal’s description of the P5 as an “exclusive and privileged club” that recognizes the UN’s indispensability and its role of the Charter principles protector. For the US it also involves recognition of the UN as an actor competent enough to serve the states’ interests. Following the pressures from within the country the US had to move from UN-skepticism towards multilateral endorsement of its policies. In fact, according to Berdal, the reputation of the UN did not suffer dramatically after the start of hostilities, as it rarely acted as a policy-making body and is more pragmatically oriented.
In the final part of the paper the author notes that the most accurate way to define the UN is by viewing it as both an actor and an arena. The performance of the two roles is not equal, as well as the record of its achievement is uneven. Certain failures are brought to our attentions, such as the inability to learn from past mistakes, to coordinate specialized agencies, to reform, the limited sources, and inconsistency of the member states. Just like the author pointed out at the beginning, it is the responsibility of the states to make the UNSC work, and any political failure is failure of their own policies.
Prof. Berdal wrote his article in 2003 and concluded that the UNSC is not going to face a “test of relevance or credibility”. However, the situation is getting more and more challenging. Once again the “international community” is asking the UN to take charge in the immediate Haiti earthquake aftermath, and commenting on its inability to respond to acute crises. As the author observes, it is not only the issues on the SC agenda that have to be addressed properly, but also those that do not involve “national interests” of the P5.
David Rieff, “Hope is not enough”, Prospect Magazine, Issue 91, October 2003
February 3, 2010
Throughout its history the UN has seen a number of peacekeeping failures, as well as successful missions. Each time the events on the ground brought the international organization and its personnel to the verge between being impartially neutral, and preaching morality. Whenever the UN celebrated the effectiveness of their missions they claimed success was theirs, while the failures were blamed on the SC member states. Such destructive interaction of the intergovernmental body and states keeps deepening the crisis within the UN structures, and a lot depends on the Secretary-General and his understanding of the UN’s challenges and the need for reform. This is the situation David Rieff describes in his article “Hope is not enough”. He clearly states the need for the UN to undertake realistic reform in order to be able to function in the present-day context and meet the needs of the wider contemporary international community. The author criticizes military unilateralism (US invasion of Iraq) stressing the fact that it is commitment and readiness to cooperate (multilateralism) that should be the UN’s driving force, not unfeasible hope.
So what does hope have to do with UN reform? According to Rieff, in the post-cold war era more states expressed their aspiration for an effective settlement of disputes, raising the bar too high for the UN. The peacekeeping operations that gained success inspired hope, but it was only possible in some of the cases based on the consent of the UN SC members. Other cases, like Kosovo and Iraq, prove the power was limited to the permanent members (P5). To keep all of them on board for a comprehensive action, the SG has to manoeuvre between the non-elective members. Even though Rieff does not express his sympathy for any of the UN SG’s, he emphasizes the benefits of Kofi Annan’s vision and diplomacy – from reaching out to the US to very ambitious MDGs – all permeated by the leitmotiv of the indispensability of the US. This was the lesson Kofi Annan learned from the UN’s predecessor the League of Nations. However, the author does express a certain degree of criticism concerning the goals of the US/Britain and the UN as in the case of Iraq: the improved relationships between the US and UN prompted the US to seek authorization of the UN for military actions in Iraq. Despite the general discontent with the US policies the UN authorized the postwar occupation by American and British forces. The author’s underlying idea is – no matter how the SG and SPSG opposed the invasion of Iraq, their rhetoric proved useless because of the postwar occupation when Iraqi people did not distinguish anymore between the UN and the US. Thus, at times the UN has to pay a too high price for its dependence on the US, and the future of the IGO strongly depends on hope vs. realpolitik.
Where is the UN heading? David Rieff considers three scenarios for the UN future. The first one suggests that the UN will become irrelevant without reform. The IGO is incapable of autonomous action: the UN was created with the concept of state sovereignty as a kernel, but the UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations disregard this idea. The SC’s decisions are heavily dependent on the members’ spheres of interest, which makes the purpose of maintaining international peace and security feeble. Rieff’s second scenario features the UN as a de facto tool for US foreign policy: the UN can only perform with the US on board. Finally, the UN could survive by carrying out reform. In spite of the fact that the composition of the UN SC does not reflect the current status of many of the states, and issues as the veto power and P5 are being questioned, the UN could make a resolute step towards reform, update itself in a way. As Rieff fairly observes “to say that an institution has outlived its time is not the same thing as saying it is useless”. Created after the World War II, the UN has been operating based on the concept of state sovereignty, i.e. it is a body “responsible to the world’s states, not the world’s people”. This remark by Rieff is very appropriate, as it shows all the controversy about sovereignty and human rights, and the conflicting interests of the P5. This brings us to the obstacles to reform defined by the author – states’ self-interest, their veto power, and the disadvantages of an expanded SC.
The prospect of the UN reform seems absolutely rational to me: the whole structure is getting rusty and outdated. Although attempts have been made to bring in the proposals of change and evolution, we have to face the reality: the UN is shaped in a way that does not easily apply or approve of these proposals. It is run by its member states, the SC gives immense power to only 5 of its members, and the Secretary General has only the power of persuasion to deal with world’s toughest problems. What makes the UN especially vulnerable is the dependency on states’ arrears to be able to operate. As long as the UN members have a share in it, they will try to manipulate, bargain and haggle. However, if financed by an independent source, it can enjoy more freedom. What kind of source it can be is a difficult question, and I can imagine that few states would allow non-state actors (such as e.g. MNCs) fund the UN. Nation-states, especially the P5, have already got addicted to their power, and just like many UN civil servants cling to their high-level jobs, they will vigorously reject the idea.
There is another issue that I find controversial about the UN: at the very beginning of the article David Rieff describes the UN as an extended family, and its staff as serving a cause, a sentiment that is anything but impartial. It is high time for the UN to reevaluate its position on state sovereignty and protection of human rights, because stating “We the peoples of the United Nations” and even purposes and principles of the UN charge with loads of responsibility, while state sovereignty seems to be a roadblock on its way. If in 1945 the UN officials could picture a state doing whatever it wants within its borders without violating human rights, they were either naïve, or the reality has changed so that nothing depends on states anymore, bur rather on non-state actors.
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